US or China? 2 Philippine provinces show the local face of a global power struggle

A new study has shed light on how the geopolitical rivalry between the United States and China is playing out at the local level in the Philippines, with provincial support for national security strategies often shaped by economic ties and exposure to Chinese activities in the South China Sea. The report by the University of the Philippines, titled “Localization of the United States–China Rivalry: Cases from the Philippines,” examined the influence of both superpowers in Cagayan and Palawan, two provinces that host sites accessible to American forces under the Enhanced Defence Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). “Big-power influence in the Philippines trickles down to the local government level because national foreign policy preferences are not diffused equally across the country,” the study said. It added that political, economic, diplomatic and military benefits from either side served as “powerful incentives for local leaders”. Cagayan lies in the far north, facing Taiwan across the Luzon Strait, while Palawan is the westernmost province, near the West Philippine Sea – Manila’s term for its exclusive economic zone within the contested South China Sea. Though both provinces host EDCA sites, researchers observed stark differences in how they viewed China’s role. In Cagayan, a long history of welcoming Chinese investment – dating back to the 1990s – has shaped political attitudes, while Palawan’s stance is strongly influenced by on-the-ground encounters with Chinese vessels in disputed waters. A key difference between the two lies in how closely their leaders align with national policy, according to Aletheia Valenciano, an assistant professor of political science at the University of the Philippines and a co-author of the study. “For Cagayan, the provincial leadership is more independent in seeking economic partnerships with China despite [the president’s] pivot to the US,” Valenciano told This Week in Asia. “In Palawan’s case, the provincial government is content to follow the official line on the South China Sea dispute.” Valenciano noted that the country’s decentralised governance structure gave local officials significant leeway in political and policy decisions, especially with regards to foreign investment. In Palawan, local government had the power to block approval of land permits along its western coast, where Chinese buyers were using Filipinos as fronts to acquire property, informants told researchers. In March, it imposed a 50-year moratorium on nickel mining in the province – formerly contributing to 25 per cent of the country’s output due to its environmental impact and perceptions of Chinese-backed mining companies. “Both examples suggest the critical role that local governments like Palawan hold in supporting or restricting local Chinese economic activities,” Valenciano said. The level of support for Chinese activities could also depend on the political preferences, economic development goals, and shifting alliances of both local and national leaderships, she added. ‘Unvalued’ in Cagayan According to the study, Cagayan’s provincial government has benefited from Chinese investment – mainly from the Cagayan Economic Zone Authority, which has become a hub for gaming operations with clients in China, and the Chico River Irrigation Pump Project under Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative. Officials told researchers that the irrigation pump project, which was completed in 2023 and covered some 7,500 hectares (18,500 acres) of farmland, had long been in the province’s wish list. However, they claimed that the national government kept ignoring their appeal, saying: “We are not being valued.” In addition, Chinese investors have offered to finance the governor’s flagship developmental initiative, the Cagayan International Gateway Project, which aims to build a new international seaport and airport to boost trade with neighbours in East Asia. Local political elites told researchers they were uneasy about whether Cagayan, being so close to Taiwan, might be caught in a US-China conflict over the island. Having not been consulted about the establishing of the EDCA sites, they were also sceptical about the accountability of the US military there, with one politician saying that US presence “prevents the province from improving the lives of its citizens”. ‘Creeping invasion’ in Palawan Meanwhile, Palawan – an island highly sought after for its natural resources, minerals, and tourism prospects – has reservations about China, due to incidents of harassment towards its fisherfolk, and a perception that some Filipino soldiers stationed in the province were selling out to their Chinese counterparts. “China has deeper economic engagements in Palawan compared to the US. However, this is overshadowed by distrust towards Chinese activities in the province, whether political, diplomatic or economic, due to the South China Sea dispute,” Valenciano said. Even if China’s presence were pervasive, she added, “it is an oversimplification to say that Palawan is vulnerable to Chinese economic influence, since the presence of other stakeholders matters as well”. One interviewee described China’s presence as “creeping invasion” and suspected that Chinese-Filipinos were engaging in dubious transactions and illegal mining activities. The great divide Academics found a lack of communication and coordination between local and national governments on several issues, including support for local economic projects, local officials’ sentiments towards the EDCA sites, and budget issues. Supporting economic development initiatives and addressing infrastructure deficits in these provinces could lessen “their economic and political vulnerabilities to external actors” such as China, Valenciano said. Miguel Hermo, the study’s co-author and a political science graduate student, stressed that the power of provincial government officials and local elites were at the bureaucratic level, “which means their roles are limited to being policy implementers”. So these officials do not have much of a choice but to accept national-level policies such as EDCA. Despite this, these local politicians could still complicate the implementation of foreign and defence policies, Edcel Ibarra, another co-author and assistant professor of political science at the University of the Philippines, told This Week in Asia. “Since local chief executives often also run political machineries, their ultimate leverage is to erode political support toward the president and his allies. Moreover, a local government unit unaligned with the national government presents an opportunity for foreign powers to exercise malign influence,” Ibarra said. Both provinces agreed on one thing, though: there was a lack of support for local projects on a national level. One respondent added that China “has managed to provide what previous national and provincial administrations could not’’.