Image Source: Getty On 31 March 2025, the Kyrgyz, Tajik, and Uzbek presidents held a groundbreaking trilateral summit, patching their border differences and boosting regional connectivity. This was the first time these three countries gathered to promote regional cooperation. The event followed the 21 February meeting in Bishkek, where the Kyrgyz and Tajik officials finalised a joint border delimitation agreement. The official signing ceremony of the deal took place on 13 March in Bishkek, attended by the presidents of both countries. The 31 March meeting produced an agreement which set up a tri-border point at the intersection of Uzbekistan’s Fergana Region, Kyrgyzstan’s Batken Region, and Tajikistan’s Sughd Region. The three countries are eager to boost cooperation between the border regions, which would involve smoother operation of customs checkpoints and construction of new and adequate infrastructure. The parties also discussed establishing a unified visa system to facilitate travel between the three countries. The three countries are eager to boost cooperation between the border regions, which would involve smoother operation of customs checkpoints and construction of new and adequate infrastructure. Moreover, Tajik and Kyrgyz leaders launched the Datka-Sogd interstate power transmission line as part of the Central Asia-South Asia (CASA)-1000 regional project. The project unites the energy systems of the two countries to supply electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan. Relatedly, the leaders of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan signed a protocol, facilitating the implementation of the document on allied relations. A separate document was signed between the Kyrgyz and Tajik leaders to facilitate the border agreement. The Kyrgyz-Tajik deal was a long time in the making. Starting in 2023, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan began mending ties as both sides showed a willingness to address the border problem. In 2024, Kyrgyz President Sadyr Japarov and his Tajik counterpart Emomali Rakhmon met during a United Nations (UN) summit, discussing the future border demarcation. Later in December that year, a preliminary agreement was signed between the two sides. The signatories announced they “reached an agreement and fully completed the drawing of the remaining sections of the Kyrgyz-Tajik state border.” The March summit effectively finalised the treaty between Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, which share a nearly 1,000 kilometre (km) border, and are currently engaged in the border delimitation. For instance, the Kyrgyz and Tajik sides have already initiated the exchange of territories: the Kyrgyz village of Dostuk, located in the Batken region of Kyrgyzstan, was transferred to Tajikistan. The Kyrgyz who lived in said village are being resettled and are offered new housing and land in another Kyrgyz village or monetary compensation. The two sides are also in talks over the future development of major highways, which would connect the two countries, as well as mutually beneficial water management. It is an issue that has long troubled their bilateral relations. More specifically, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have agreed to share control over the strategically important Golovnoy water intake, which should prevent further conflicts over access to water. The two sides are also in talks over the future development of major highways, which would connect the two countries, as well as mutually beneficial water management. Soviet Legacy Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have long conflicted over a shared border since the end of the Soviet era, when often unjustified border lines drawn by Soviet officials did not correspond to the ethnic and social realities on the ground. Moscow also did not factor in the aspect of pastoralism prevalent in the early 20th century. This led to a situation where multiple enclaves were created on both sides of the border, which complicated border crossings and often led to deadly clashes. In the post-Soviet period, unequal access to water resources further compounded the situation. Border negotiations have been intermittently held since the breakup of the erstwhile Soviet Union. However, it reached a standstill in 2011, at which point only half of the border was agreed upon. Tensions led to frequent clashes. For instance, in 2021 and 2022, major armed clashes led to multiple deaths on both sides. The Kyrgyz-Tajik conflict was further exacerbated by the fact that much of their nearly 1,000 km-long (621 miles) border runs across the Fergana Valley—Central Asia’s most productive and densely populated region, making it a highly coveted land. Indeed, around 20 percent of the Central Asian population resides in the Valley, making the territory a source of constant instability given the arbitrary manner with which the Soviets drew border lines. The Tajiks are also irked, as they often crossed the nonexistent border line into Kyrgyzstan for work, trade and even contraband. The progress made so far is indeed meaningful, even though some unaddressed issues, such as the road crossings between the two countries, remain. For instance, the Vorukh enclave located in Tajikistan will remain under Dushanbe’s control. Yet the road (the control over which often led to ethnic clashes) passing through this land will remain in common use. This angered the Kyrgyz population. The Kyrgyz population remembers vividly how disadvantageous the handover of the Barak enclave to Uzbekistan was. There are also concerns over the lack of information on stipulations in the actual agreement. Moreover, the Tajiks are also irked, as they often crossed the nonexistent border line into Kyrgyzstan for work, trade and even contraband. Additionally, unless there are real economic incentives, the borderland population will continue to abandon their homeland and emigrate to Russia and other places. This means the contest for control of the territories along the border might revive. Geopolitical Context The wider geopolitical picture favours this shift in Uzbek-Tajik-Kyrgyz relations. Thus, the Ukraine war might have served as a powerful incentive for the countries to resolve the border problem. With Russia preoccupied with the conflict, it has had little interest and perhaps even ability to facilitate the talks between Central Asian countries. Then there is Tajikistan, which over the past year has pushed for better ties not only with Kyrgyzstan but also Iran and Afghanistan. For instance, in January, the Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian visited Tajikistan and reversed a negative trend which has been prevalent in bilateral relations since the 1990s, when, during the civil war in Tajikistan, the Iranian side was accused of supporting the Opposition to the current president Emomali Rahmon. The highlight of the January visit was the signing of 22 memoranda of understanding covering infrastructure, trade, anti-corruption efforts, energy, and security. Even with Afghanistan, though Dushanbe continues to refuse to recognise the Taliban government due to security concerns, there are signs that Afghanistan and Tajikistan could be looking at normalising bilateral relations. The border between the two was opened in 2023, and Tajikistan continues to export electricity to its neighbour. There have even been meetings between intelligence services of the two countries to tackle extremism, and the two countries seem to cooperate on the proposed 250-mile (403 km) railway project from Tajikistan to Afghanistan to Turkmenistan (TAT). Even with Afghanistan, though Dushanbe continues to refuse to recognise the Taliban government due to security concerns, there are signs that Afghanistan and Tajikistan could be looking at normalising bilateral relations. Central Asian countries also look forward to playing a more active role in shifting connectivity in Eurasia. China has been building new roads and railways across Central Asia and is engaged in developing the Middle Corridor, which stretches to the Black Sea. Relatedly, Russia is pushing forward with its International North-South Transport Corridor, with one of its branches passing through Central Asia. The region’s countries want to benefit from this favourable international situation, and it is no wonder that the Kyrgyz-Uzbek-Tajik reconciliation takes place at this pivotal moment for Central Asia. Central Asia’s opening to the outside world is thus a major development, but in no way a new historical process. The region has always been central in Eurasia-wide trade routes, known as the Silk Roads. One of the highways stretched southward toward Afghanistan and India, creating what historians often call the ‘Indian Road’. Looking Ahead The major source of Central Asia’s weakness is its high potential for interstate conflicts. While the initial epicentre was the Kyrgyz-Tajik border, now with the demarcation process being successfully carried out between Dushanbe and Bishkek, coupled with favourable geopolitical circumstances in Eurasia, the Central Asian region is poised to evolve into a powerful trade hub, simultaneously interconnected with China, Russia, the European Union and India. Given the US-China competition in the Indo-Pacific region and Washington’s determination to constrain Beijing’s maritime ambitions, Eurasia’s overland routes are set to play a bigger role. Indeed, Beijing, Moscow and others may continue developing connectivity through Central Asia. What can slow down this trend is the breakdown of long-distance trade (an unlikely scenario) and the potential for interstate conflict. Tensions may be high across Eurasia, but recent developments indicate that the opposite is true for Central Asia. Emil Avdaliani is a professor of International Relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia International Affairs Central Asia The views expressed above belong to the author(s). ORF research and analyses now available on Telegram! Click here to access our curated content — blogs, longforms and interviews.